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THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT*
CHARLES E. CLARK**
T HE RECENT spread of the summary judgment procedure in
American practice may be traced in substance to the impetus
afforded by a simple unheralded New York rule of court of 1921. At
that time the Empire State adopted with considerable fanfare a new
Civil Practice Act, supposed to include the best features of English
procedure, although later experience has shown certain distressing
omissions and inconsistencies.' The statute did not contain any
provision for the summary judgment. The judges, however, in
adopting rules of civil practice to supplement the Practice Act set
up a rule for the purpose, Rule 113, which, as we now see, has had
substantial vogue in that state and elsewhere. Perhaps that experi-
ence has some significance as to the potentialities of the rule-
making process generally! The model naturally was the English
rule which since the middle of the nineteenth century had provided
this ready means for disposition of claims on bills of exchange and
promissory notes, later extended to all but a few unusual and dis-
favored actions, such as- fraud and libel.2 It is true that New Jersey
had adopted the English provision yet earlier in 1912, and Michigan
has had a workable, though limited, act since 1915. 8 And there
were still earlier American analogies, such as the motion practice
*This paper represents a revision of an address given by the writer as
part of a Continuation Legal Course on the New Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure at the University of Minnesota on Dec. 21, 1951. It has been
thought desirable to retain the general approach as one of exposition of the
actual rule, both because of the original purpose of the Institute to assist the
lawyers in initiation of the new procedure and because the writer has dis-
cussed these problems elsewhere so often as to make any other course repeti-
tious. So documentation here has been kept to a minimum; general citation
may be made, in addition to the articles cited in succeeding notes, to the
writer's Code Pleading 556-567 (2d ed. 1947) and to his Cases on Modem
Pleading 393-404, 502-528 (1952), in compilation of which Professor Charles
Alan Wright of Minnesota assisted.
**United States Circuit Judge, Second Circuit; Reporter and Member,
Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, Supreme Court of the
United States; former Dean, Yale Law School.
1. Some of these are discussed in Clark & Wright, The Judicial Coun-
cil and the Rule-Making Power: A Dissent and A Protest, 1 Syracuse L.
Rev. 346 (1950). And see Clark, Code Pleading 556 (2d ed. 1947), passim.
2. See Eng. Rules of Supreme Court, 0. 3, r. 6, 0. 14, 0. 14A, and 0.
15. For the history see Clark & Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38 Yale
L. J. 423 (1929); Clark, Summary Judgments, A.B.A. Jud. Adm. Mono-
graphs, Ser. A, No. 5, 2 F.R.D. 364, 25 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 20 (1941), 1942
Handbk. Nat. Conf. Jud. Councils 55; for its success in England see Sunder-
land, A) Appraisal of English Procedure, 9 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 164, 166
(1926).
3. Clark & Samenow, supra note 2; and see People's Wayne County
Bank v. Wolverine Box Co., 250 Mich. 273, 230 N. W. 170 (1930).
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in Virginia, which has long been a means of effective initiation of
litigation by motion.4 Nor is there anything strange in a motion
for judgment summarily entered when no defense is shown or when
the defense appears to be sham or frivolous. The real step is in the
means permitted to demonstrate the sham or false character of the
defense, even where it might appear fair on the face of the pleading,
through materials outside the pleadings, notably affidavits so par-
ticularized as to require like answering affidavits to disclose the
genuineness of the issue asserted. The obvious difficulty was the
constitutional right of trial by jury. When the constitutionality of
the procedure was established in New York,5 and the success of the
new innovation was ably publicized by noteworthy articles," its
popularity grew and imitation followed.
After New York and New Jersey, Connecticut adopted the pro-
cedure in 1929" and interesting developments occurred in states
such as Wisconsin, Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico.8 At the
present time some thirty American states have some provision for a
summary judgment.9 But not until the advent of the Federal Rules
4. Chisholm v. Gilmer, 299 U. S. 99 (1936), and references given in
the Court's footnote 1; also Fowler, Virginia Notice of Motion Procedure-
A Case Study in Procedural Reforin, 24 Va. L. Rev. 711 (1938) ; cf. Millar,
Three American Ventures in Sumnary Civil Procedure, 38 Yale L. J. 193
(1928).
5. General Investment Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 235
N. Y. 133, 139 N. E. 216 (1923) ; -anna v. Mitchell, 202 App. Div. 504, 196
N. Y. Supp. 43 (1st Dep't 1922), affd 235 N. Y. 534, 139 N. E. 724 (1923) ;
Dwan v. Massarene, 199 App. Div. 872, 192 N. Y. Supp. 577 (1st Dep't 1922) ;
and see also Eisele v. Raphael, 90 N. J. L. 219, 223, 101 Atl. 200, 202 (1917) ;
Wittemann v. Giele, 99 N. J. L. 478, 123 Ati. 716 (1924); People's Wayne
County Bank v. Wolverine Box Co., 250 Mich. 273, 230 N. W. 170 (1930) ;
cf. Diversey Liquidating Corp. v. Neunkirchen, 370 Ill. 523, 19 N. E. 2d 363
(1939).
6. Among the many articles--see Clark, Code Pleading 558 (2d ed.
1947)-may be cited Finch, Summary Judgments under the Civil Practice
Act in New York, 49 A. B. A. Rep. 588 (1924) ; Finch, Summary Judg-
ment Procedure, 19 A. B. A. J. 504 (1933) ; McCall, Summary Judgment
under New York Rules, 10 A. B. A. J. 22 (1924); Cohen, Summary Judg-
ments in the Supreme Court of New York, 32 Col. L. Rev. 825 (1932) ;
Saxe, Sumnnary Judgments in New York, 19 Cornell L. Q. 237 (1934) ; and
the valuable monograph, Shientag, Summary Judgment (1941), a revision
of 4 Ford. L. Rev. 186 (1935).
7. Clark, The New Summary Judgment Rule, 3 Conn. B. J. 1 (1929),
15 A. B. A. J. 82 (1929).
8. As pointed out below, the Wisconsin experience would seem par-
ticularly helpful to Minnesota lawyers. See Boesel, Summary Judgment Pro-
cedure, 6 Wis. L. Rev. 5 (1930) ; Ritter & Magnuson, The Motion for
Sunmnary Judgment and Its Extension to All Classes of Actions. 21 Marq.
L. Rev. 33 (1936) ; Young, [1944] Wis. L. Rev. 141, 161, 162; Solie, [1947]
Wis. L. Rev. 422.
9. Vanderbilt, Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration 219, 220
(1949) lists 28 American jurisdictions; since the publication of this book,
Utah and Minnesota have adopted the Federal Rules.
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of Civil Procedure was there any general movement for a broad
and inclusive type of rule; thus such a state as Texas, on revision
of its procedure, omitted any provision for it.1o The Federal Rules,
however, set forth a new and improved form which has been ac-
cepted, along with the other federal provisions, in that considerable
bloc of states now following that practice, including as of most re-
cent date New Jersey and Utah and, just lately, Minnesota.1 The
striking difference between the federal rule and previous models is
that the procedure is available in any civil action. Though in New
York and elsewhere the category of actions wherein the summary
judgment was an available remedy has been greatly extended, it is
still true in those jurisdictions that it can be had only in the actions
named and designated in the rule or statute.J2 But when we came
to the drafting of the Federal Rules, we found a considerable view
that these limitations were not justified in themselves and led to
confusion and waste in determining their application.' 3 So the
shackles were stricken off and the states have followed this lead.
Thus New Jersey, which had had the restricted rule, substituted the
more general rule in its adoption of federal procedure in 1948.'4 And
so you in Minnesota in your new procedure will have no pre-
liminary question of deciding whether the particular action is itself
for a "liquidated demand" or some other designated type of claim.
You need only apply the provisions of the rule itself, Federal and
10. Its omission was deplored in Suggs & Stumberg, Summary Judg-
mert Procedure, 22 Tex. L. Rev. 433 (1944), and Clark, The Texas and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 Tex. L. Rev. 4, 10 (1941). See Mc-
Donald, Summary Judgments, 30 Tex. L. Rev. 285 (1952), discussing in
some detail the adoption in 1950 of Rule 166-A, 148 Tex. 607, 612, following
the original F.R. 56
11. For the states following the Federal Rules see Clark, Cases on
.Modern Pleading 24 (1952) ; Clark, The Federal Rules in State Practice,
23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 520 (1951) ; and Clark, Code Pleading and Practice
Today, in David Dudley Field Centenary Essays 55, 67-70 (1949).
12. See discussion of "debt or liquidated demand" in Waxman v. Wil-
liamson, 256 N. Y. 117, 175 N. E. 534 (1931), also Norwood Morris Plan
Co. v. McCarthy, 295 Mass. 597, 4 N. E. 2d 4 0 (1936). When in New York
the motion was made available to defendants as to defenses, it was ruled that
defendants were not limited to the actions specified in the rule, as are plain-
tiffs. Lederer v. Wise Shoe Co., 276 N. Y. 459, 12 N. E. 2d 544 (1938), a
view confirmed by a 1944 amendment to N. Y. Civ. Prac. Rule 113.
13. See Committee Notes to F.R. 56 and to Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure for the District Courts, Rule 56 (Tent. Draft 1950) ; Ritter &
Magnuson, supra note 8; Clark, supra note 2; N. Y. Com. on the Administra-
tion of Justice 287 (1934) ; Third Rep. N. Y. Jud. Council 30 (1937) ; also
Pike & Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure, 38 Col.
L. Rev. 1436, 1455-1458 (1938).
14. N. J. Rules Civ. Prac. Rule 3:56 (1948), in place of the former
rule quoted and applied as in Nolte v. Nannino, 107 N. J. L. 462, 154 Atl.
831 (1931). Wis. Stat. § 270.635(2) and (7) (1949) authorizes summary
judgment on motion of either plaintiff or defendant in any civil action.
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Minnesota Rule 56. Let us turn to that rule and consider it first in
its various parts and then in its setting along with the other pre-
trial devices.
Subd. (a) of the Federal Rule or .01 of your rule is entitled "For
Claimant" and provides for the motion by one claiming a judgment,
that is, a plaintiff, or a counter- or cross-claimant. The second sub-
division, (b) or .02, is entitled "For Defending Party" and pro-
vides for a motion by the party opposing the grant of relief. A main
reason for the separate statement is to make clear and precise the
use of the motion by any party. As we have seen, the procedure grew
as a plaintiff's or claimant's motion; and some jurisdictions have
even added separate motions, as time went on, to care for defensive
judgments.'- The federal form, however, makes clear the inclusive
nature of the remedy as to both parties and claims or defenses. A
subordinate reason for the separation is the slight distinction in
time when the motions are available in order to provide for some
protection to a defendant against too hasty a claim for judgment by
a plaintiff. So a defending party may move at any time, whereas a
claimant may not move before twenty days after the commencement
of the action (the time normally given for answer) or after the
adverse party has moved for judgment. Very likely this shows an
excess of caution; thus a distinguished member of our Advisory
Committee made an offer-as yet unaccepted-to eat his trousers if
anyone could ever show any precipitate action in any lawsuit to off-
set the more usual interminable delays. But at any rate the protec-
tion is here. The rule also provides that a party may "move with or
without supporting affidavits," a grant of flexibility to include the
old demurrer or motion on the face of the pleadings about which
I shall have something to say later.
An interesting question has arisen whether a summary judg-
ment may be entered against a moving party in the absence of
formal motion by his opponent. In the cases where no sharp dispute
on the facts is uncovered, determination of the case may well turn
upon adjudication of a serious issue of law. When both parties
have moved for summary judgment, the issue is of course clearly
presented for final disposition. But this course may seem so ob-
viously indicated to a party opposing a motion that he may fail or
neglect to present a formal motion. Here the Advisory Committee
15. Compare the separate motions in New York for setting up speci-
fied defenses to the complaint or answer by supporting affidavits, N. Y. Civ.
Prac. Rules 108, 110, and the extension of the original Rule 113 by amend-
went as noted in note 12 suzra.
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THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
hesitated to authorize such a judgment without formal request
therefor and has left what I fear is an ambiguity and a slight leaning
toward formality, such as has now been avoided in New York and
Wisconsin."6 As yet there is no authoritative federal decision, al-
though the trend of rulings in the district courts is to hold the formal
motion here unnecessary.'7 This is an instance where, seemingly,
the judges on the firing line have reached a better result than that
suggested by inhibitions of the drafting committee. Perhaps a like
result may come from your own judges in the active arena with
respect to the troubles of your committee, so vividly described to us
by Chairman Youngquist, in trying to restrict the meaning of
"transaction" in the counterclaim Rule 13 and suggesting a limita-
tion on its operation which, in my humble judgment, is both
inoperable and undesirable !'I
Next we turn to subd. (c) or .03, which is the vital heart of the
rule. The first two sentences deal only with matters of time and
detail. But the third sentence states the fundamental and guiding
principle: "The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law." The touchstone thus is the absence of a genuine
issue as to a material fact. These are very carefully chosen words
intended to express a very definite thought. Various courts have
attempted to better this formula by others which tend to bend the
principle to their ideas of policy--with deleterious results, as I shall
point out later. But note, too, that the judge is to apply this prin-
ciple after examining everything before him in the file: pleadings,
affidavits, depositions, or admissions. This is important. He takes
the case as it actually is shown to be, not as the formal allegations of
a pleading may have embodied a pleader's hope. On the other hand,
the absence of affidavits or like material does not prevent the judg-
16. N. Y. Civ. Prac. Rule 113 as amended in 1944; Wis. Stat. §270.635(3) (1949).
17. The federal cases are collected in Clark, Cases on Modern Plead-
ing 514, n. 13 (1952).
18. The reference is to the recent amendment striking the word "con-
tract" from Rule 13.01 as to compulsory counterclaims and "contract" or
"occurrence" from Rule 13.02 as to permissive counterclaims. The hope
appears to be that the word "transaction" now left in the rule will be nar-
rowly construed; but why the successful and desirable federal procedure,
avoiding duplicating litigation in such a critical field as, for instance, that
of the automobile accident, should be either cut back or confused is hard to
understand. Wright, Joinder of Clains and Parties Under Modern Pleading
Rules, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 580, 587-591 (1952).
1952]
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ment if it seems indicated as a matter of law.1' Thus the remedy may
serve the functions both of the old demurrer and of other more
modern pre-trial objections also, a point developed below. A final
sentence here provides: "A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue. of liability alone although
there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages." This was
added to the federal rule by amendment effective in 1948 to avoid
the unfortunate result found necessary under the earlier rule in
Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corporation,0 of denial of all
summary judgment when the only contested issue was as to the
amount of the damages.
21
The next subdivision, (d) or .04, is important as exemplifying
what can be properly termed the discovery or pre-trial aspects
of the rule. It provides that if a judgment is not rendered upon
the whole case and a trial is necessary, the court nevertheless, by
examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by inter-
rogating counsel, "shall, if practicable, ascertain what material facts
exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are
actually and in good faith controverted." It then should enter an
order specifying the facts that are without substantial controversy
and directing the further proceedings in the case. This is in sub-
stance a pre-trial order of the same form as that provided for in
the pre-trial rule itself, Rule 1.6. This workable procedure demon-
strates how closely this rule is tied in spirit and in fact to the
other pre-trial devices.
22
The remaining three subdivisions of the rule round out the
process by specific directions as to certain important matters of
detail. Subd. (e) or .05 deals with the form of the supporting and
opposing affidavits which must be made on personal knowledge,
must set forth "such facts as would be admissible in evidence," and
must show affirmatively that the affiant "is competent to testify to
the matters stated therein." Provision is also made for supplemental
or further affidavits or opposing depositions, as the court may per-
mit. Subd. (f) or .06 provides for refusal or continuance of the case
when a party shows that he cannot then present essential facts; the
19. See Dunn v. J. P. Stevens & Co., 192 F. 2d 854 (2d Cir. 1951),
and cases there cited.
20. 321 U. S. 620 (1948).
21. See Commentary, Summary Judgment as to Damages, 7 Fed. Rules
Serv. 974; Advisory Committee's Note to amendment to F. R. 56(c).
22. Detailed references to the pre-trial procedure, with citations to
illustrative material, are given in Clark, Cases on Modern Pleading 529-544
(1952) ; materials on discovery a.pear at id. 465-501.
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continuance may be for the obtaining of further affidavits or the
taking of depositions or the securing of discovery. And subd. (g)
or .07 provides various penalties, including expenses, attorney's
fees, and contempt orders, for affidavits presented in bad faith or
solely for the purpose of delay.
What are the uses to which the new remedy may be devoted?
They are many, including all the old methods of pre-trial attack
covered by such devices as the demurrer or the motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings and the newer "speaking" motion so called.
In fact they will include everything except motions aimed directly
at perfecting or improving the pleadings. These are no longer
necessary because the summary judgment searches for the merits
irrespective of the pleadings. Of course the motion may lead inciden-
tally to pleading amendments when it suggests or results in further
proceedings in the case, including trial; but such improvement of
detail is more a by-product than a main objective, as is the case
throughout modern pleading. Its obvious use to determine ques-
tions of law, as on the old demurrer, is perhaps not so immediately
interesting as its use in settling certain issues of fact, or as a
"speaking" motion.
The use of this name brings up some history and helps to place
this new procedure against the background of the past. At common
law the old demurrer was limited strictly to presenting an issue
of law. Thus it was held to admit all the opposing allegations of
fact and to say that even so there was no legal right. The fetish of
the common law to obtain a single clear-cut issue-of fact by alle-
gation and traverse, of law by allegation and demurrer-thus did
not admit of mixing law and facts; in consequence the demurrer had
a rigidity and a limited usefulness which made it an ineffective
instrument in all except the most clear-cut cases of absence of
legal right. But the common-law rule prohibiting a "speaking" de-
murrer, i.e., one which spoke or made assertions of fact itself, was
quite absolute. 2' The summary judgment is obviously utterly at vari-
ance with this conception. Under the Federal Rules the most direct
counterpart for the old demurrer is the motion for judgment under
Rule 12(b), particularly when based upon the ground of "failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Upon the adop-
tion of the rules a question soon arose as to whether this motion
could be supported by facts outside the pleadings or whether it was
23. Clark, Code Pleading 514 (2d ed. 1947) ; Committee's Note to Minn.
Rule 12.03 (Tent. Draft 1950), citing Pirsig's Dunnell on Minn. Pleading
§1657.
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as strictly limited as the demurrer. Some division occurred in the
cases, but the majority came to accept the idea of the "speaking
motion," holding it more within the spirit of the new system and
viewing resort only to Rule 56 as an unwarranted technicality."'
This in substance is the position taken by the Federal Advisory
Committee in recommending amendments to clarify the rules-
amendments effective March 19, 1948. But it went further and
canalized the procedure within rather clear-cut limits which pre-
cisely determine the interrelation of this and the summary judg-
ment rule. And since Minnesota has quite properly accepted the
amended form of the rules, it is necessary to explain this inter-
connection. It is true that the writer, as Reporter to the Advisory
Committee, originally recommended what he hoped would be a
simpler procedure whereby the motion for summary judgment
would swallow all other motions and become the one single form for
making all objections in advance of the answer..2 But the Advisory
Committee decided otherwise, a decision of policy with which he
has no serious quarrel. For it is often true that accepting as a
procedural principle what seems on the surface to be broad, flexible,
and simple actually defeats its own end as it leaves the bench and
bar without apparent guide. Then procedural inhibitions of the past
come into play to make only the ancient practice seem the sure
and safe way. Consequently the sharply marked course, however
narrow, may be the one most used.26
At any rate the additions by amendment are definite in their
grant of power. They appear in the provision as to stating defenses
of Rule 12, subd. (b) or .02, and in that as to the motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings of subd. (c) or .03. Thus the second sub-
division provides that if on a motion to dismiss for failure of the
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted-the
ancient "failure to state a cause of action"-matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, "the mo-
tion shall be treated as one for summary judgment" under Rule 56
and so disposed of, with all the consequences as well as protections
24. See, e.g., Gallup v. Caldwell, 120 F. 2d 90, 92-93 (3d Cir. 1941).
and other cases cited in Advisory Committee's Note to amendment to F. R.
12(b); Clark, Code Pleading 540-544 (2d ed. 1947); 2 Moore, Federal
Practice fl2.09 (2d ed. 1948).
25. See Clark, Simplified Pleading, A.B.A. Jud. Adm. 'Monographs.
Ser. A, No. 18, 2 F.R.D. 456, 464-465, 27 Iowa L. Rev. 272 (1942), 1942
Handbk. Nat. Conf. Jud. Councils 136.
26. The detailed rules for deposition and discovery are an illustration.
See Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes
and Rules, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 493 (1950).
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afforded by the rule. The provisions of subd. (c) or .03 are similar.
What happens is that reliance by either party to any "speaking"
materials, i.e., affidavits, depositions, admissions, or stipulations,
will immediately transform a motion initially based merely on the
formal pleadings into one for summary judgment on the merits
unless the judge affirmatively prevents. Actually, of course, as the
federal experience is demonstrating, no judge will wish to shut
his eyes to informative material on file unless there is some good
reason in the particular case, such as interminable delays or eva-
sions of a party or the existence of a decisive question of law making
further search of the record unnecessary. In practice, therefore, the
pleading motion becomes one on the merits.2 7
As the federal experience shows, the importance of this transfor-
mation is great. It not only avoids successive duplicating motions
first of form and then of substance, with fierce shadow battles as to
which is to be employed; it also shifts the whole emphasis from the
niceties of pleading or the perfecting of the proper paper docu-
ments to a discriminating search for the merits. Naturally such a
direction to the proceedings is often more of a boon to the pleader
than to the movant for judgment; for it is well settled that judg-
ient is to be denied if merit is disclosed even though the pleadings
be formally inadequate. Of course, they may then be amended
or even treated as amended without formal documents under the
provisions for amendments to conform to the evidence of Rule
15(b). 28
Perhaps no other provision quite so strikingly emphasizes the
crowning spirit of the rules as does this important Rule 12 in its
present form. It demonstrates that the merits must always control
and direct the course of the proceedings; the pleadings must remain
a definite adjunct, subordinate in character, to that main objective.20
The limitation of the new provision to the defense of failure to state
27. See, e.g., William J. Kelly Co. v. Reconstruction Finance Corp.,
172 F. 2d 865 (1st Cir. 1949) ; Allison v. Mackey, 188 F. 2d 983 (D.C. Cir.
1951); Suckow Borax Mines Consolidated v. Borax Consolidated, Ltd., 185
F. 2d 196 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 943 (1951) ; cf. Moffett
v. Commerce Trust Co., 187 F. 2d 242 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U. S.
818 (1951) ; Clark, E.xcperience under the Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and New Title 28,
U. S. Code Judiciary and Judicial Procedure 1, 6, 14, 24 (1952 Rev. ed.).
28. See, e.g., Callaway v. Hamilton Nat. Bank of Washington, 195 F. 2d
556 (D.C. Cir. 1952) ; Gruen Watch Co. v. Artists Alliance, 191 F. 2d 700
(9th Cir. 1951); Pacific American Fisheries v. Mullaney, 191 F. 2d 137
(9th Cir. 1951); Chappell v. Goltsman, 186 F. 2d 215 (5th Cir. 1950)
Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F. 2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
29. See discussion in Clark, supra note 25; and see also Clark, Cases
cn Modern Pleading 371-378, 393-404 (1952).
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a claim is not at variance with this or formidable in itself. It was
done because the manner of settling issues as to the jurisdiction of
the court or service of process has long been well settled and should
not be disturbed. In the federal system the practice has been to use
affidavits here too.80
Two further interrelated or contrasted matters remain for con-
sideration: the use of the summary motion as an instrument of dis-
covery and the fear of trial by affidavits. These are important
because they have to do with the practical use which may be made
of the motion beyond the limits set by the old demurrer for ques-
tions of law. Some appellate judges have expressed substantial fear
of the potentially wide scope of the motion and have gone so far as
to demand the denial where there is the "slightest doubt" as to the
facts? 1 This easy cliche has tended then to be accepted by trial
judges as a substitute for the carefully chosen formula of the rule,
justifying a preemptory denial of all motions not based on issues of
law. There is no denying that in certain localities the use of the
remedy has been much restricted by such a course of precedents ;32
in others, however, there has been a closer approach to a sound state
practice such as that of Wisconsin, where the remedy seems to have
been reasonably effective.3 3 And the Judicial Conference of the
United States has called attention to the value of the "related
provisions" of the discovery and summary judgment rules, and
urged the promotion of their use by the district judges.34 One now
senses some amelioration of the opposition for a time stated by
30. Fed. Form 19; 2 Moore, Federal Practice f12.09, n. 8 (2d ed.
1948). Cf. Riley v. Titus, 190 F. 2d 653 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U. S.
855 (1951) ; Nash-Kelvinator Corp. v. California Refrigerator Repair Shop,
11 F. R. D. 313 (S.D. Cal. 1950). The limitation appears only in subd. .02,
and not in .03, the motion for judgment on the pleadings.
31. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F. 2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946); Doehler Metal
Furniture Co. v. United States, 149 F. 2d 130 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Peckham v.
Ronrico Corp., 171 F. 2d 653, 657 (1st Cir. 1948); Traylor v. Black,
Sivalls & Bryson, Inc., 189 F. 2d 213 (8th Cir. 1951).
32. This judicial attitude has called forth much critical discussion. See,
e.g., Melville, Summary Judgment and Discovery: The Amended Riles Will
Add to Their Usefulness, 34 A. B. A. J. 187 (1948) ; Scope of Summaryv
Jiudgment under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 55 Yale L. J. 810 (1946) ;
Factors Affecting the Grant or Denial of Sunnary Judgment, 48 Col. L.
Rev. 780 (1948); Kennedy, The Federal Summary Jufdgiment Rie-Sonie
Recent Developments, 13 Brooklyn L. Rev. 5 (1947); Branda, Summary
Judgment in the Federal Courts, S9 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 212 (1950) ; Locke,
Summary Judgment, 25 Wash. L. Rev. 71 (1950); 33 A. B. A. J. 1111, 1112
(1947) ; 45 Col. L. Rev. 964 (1945) ; 61 Harv. L. Rev. 375 (1948) ; Clark,
supra note 26.
33. See note 8 supra.
34. Rep. Jud. Conf. of the U. S. 36, 37 (Sept. 1948).
(Vol. 36:567
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
appellate judges.3 5 There is nevertheless danger in the operation
of that Gresham's Law of Procedural Precedents whereby the
technical drives out the liberal rule. There is little for a judge to
say in making or affirming a permissive ruling-only when he holds
this course to be error does he tend to the luxury of profound
and quotable restrictions which ripple ever more broadly in later
precedents to confound the practice of the future.3 6 Judges should
remember how easy it is thus to freeze the procedure of the future
and should therefore eschew any propensity to announce funda-
mental precepts as a basis for practice decisions.
The use of the motion as an adjunct of discovery of course oc-
curs when the movant clearly and precisely discloses his case in
the affidavits to which he seeks reply from his opponent. The in-
tention of the rule is that the person addressed must repel the at-
tack by equally precise disclosure of the merits of his case. As
said in one case where an insurance claimant declines to disclose
medical testimony in advance of trial: "But the history of the de-
velopment of this procedure shows that it is intended to permit 'a
party to pierce the allegations of fact in the pleadings and to obtain
relief by summary judgment where facts set forth in detail in affi-
davits, depositions, and admissions on file show that there are no
genuine issues of fact to be tried.' ,,. And summary judgment was
affirmed against a litigant who relied on a claim of "privileged
communication" to hold back his intended proof until he could get
to trial. This principle has since been successively affirmed not-
withstanding the expressed fear of trial by affidavits and may be
considered as settled federal law."
35. Note particularly cases such as are cited in note 38 infra. Others
appear in late issues of the Federal Rules Service under Rule 56(c). See,
e.g., Park-in-Theatres v. Perkins, 190 F. 2d 137 (9th Cir. 1951) (patent
infringement); Ricker v. General Electric Co., 162 F. 2d 141 (2d Cir. 1947)(plagiarism) ; Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U. S. 220, 235 (1946) (fraud) ; DLxon v.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 159 F. 2d 863 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U. S. 764 (1947) (same); De Luca v. Atlantic Refining Co., 176 F. 2d
421 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 943 (1950) ; Petrie v. Roberts, 242
Wis. 539, 8 N. W. 2d 355 (1943). Of course the reports show many denials
or reversals of summary judgments; thus see 3 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal
Practice and Procedure 131-174 (1950).
36. See discussion in Clark, supra note 26, at 497-498; Clark, supra
note 27, at 23-24.
37. Engl v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F. 2d 469, 472 (2d Cir. 1943).
38. As in, e.g., Brooks v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 187 F. 2d 869 (2d Cir.
1951) ; Compania de Remorque y Salvamento, S.A. v. Esperance, Inc., 187 F.
2d 114 (2d Cir. 1951); Forde v. United States, 189 F. 2d 727 (1st Cir.
1951); Hisel v. Chrysler Corp., 94 F. Supp. 996 (W.D. Mo. 1951). See also
Foster v. General Motors Corp., 191 F. 2d 907 (7th Cir. 1951) ; Brensinger
v. Margaret Ann Super 'Markets, 192 F. 2d 458 (5th Cir. 1951) ; Orvis v.
Brickman ....... F. 2d ..... (D.C. Cir. 1952); Machado v. McGrath, 193 F. 2d
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It is obvious that judges should be careful not to grant judg-
ment against one who shows a genuine issue as to a material fact.
Just as obvious is the obligation to examine a case with care to
see that a trial is not forced upon a litigant by one with no case
at all. The very freedom permitted by the simplified pleadings of
the modern practice is subject to abuse unless it is checked by
the devices looking to the summary disclosure of the merits if
the case is to continue to trial. Those are discovery, summary judg-
ment, and pre-trial-all necessary correlatives of each other and
of a system which may permit concealment of the weakness of a
case in the generalized pleadings of the present day. Refusal of
!:unmary disposal of the case may be a real hardship on the more
deserving of the litigants; since appeal does not lie from refusal.
as it does from the grant,3 the penalties may be the severer. A court
has failed in granting justice when it forces a party to an expensive
trial of several weeks' duration to meet purely formal allegations
without substance fully as much as when it improperly refuses to
hear a case at all.
40
There is no desire to minimize the problem before the courts,
trial as well as appellate. Involved may well be all the delicate
balancing of interests so much a part of the judge's function and
responsibility. Of course, too, he is considering the entry of a
definitive final judgment, which will become res judicata in a way
the demurrer in itself never was,41 although the procedures for
reopening judgments are not difficult and are often resorted to
where new light can properly be offered.42 Nor is decision easier
706 (D.C. Cir. 1951) ; Stanaland v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 192 F. 2d
432 (5th Cir. 1951) ; Albert Dickinson Co. v. Mellos Peanut Co. of Illinois,
179 F. 2d 265 (7th Cir. 1950).
39. McGrath v. Hunt, Hill & Betts, 194 F. 2d 529 (2d Cir. 1952);
Morgenstern Chemical Co. v. Schering Corp., 181 F. 2d 160, 161 (3d Cir.
1950) ; Jetco, Inc. v. jiffy Products Co., 192 F. 2d 852 (9th Cir. 1951).
40. See, e.g., the later history of Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F. 2d 464
(2d Cir. 1946), in 158 F. 2d 795 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U. S. 851
(1947), finally terminating what is termed "one of the most absurd plagiarism
suits on record" by Sigmund Spaeth in A History of Popular Music 553
(1948) ; or the full history of the suit concerning the novel "Rebecca,"
MacDonald v. Du Maurier, 144 F. 2d 696 (2d Cir. 1944), 75 F. Supp. 653
(S.D. N.Y. 1946), 75 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. N.Y. 1948), with appeal abandoned
after an order for an increased bond for costs. Clark, Cases on Modern
Pleading 525, 526 (1952).
41. Stokke v. Southern Pac. Co., 169 F. 2d 42 (10th Cir. 1948). For
the older rule on demurrer see Clark, Code Pleading 527-529 (2d ed. 1947) ;
Keljikian v. Star Brewing Co., 303 Mass. 53, 20 N. E. 2d 465 (1939) ; 34
Yale L. J. 905 (1925).
42. As provided in F. R. 60; see, e.g., Markert v. Swift & Co., 173 F.
2d 517, 519 (2d Cir. 1949) ; Kelly v. Delaware River joint Commission, 187
F. 2d 93 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U. S. 812 (1951) ; Tozer v. Charles A.
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than other serious problems facing a judge. Even such a suggestive
and at times fruitful analogy as that of the motion for a directed
verdict after a trial is not a rule of thumb, as is shown by the two
opposing opinions of the Supreme Court in Sartor v. Arkansas
Natural Gas Corporation.43 What is needed is the application of
common sense, good judgment, and decisive action, on the one
hand, not to shut a deserving litigant from his trial and, on the
other, not to allow harassment of an equally deserving suitor for
immediate relief by a long and worthless trial. Formulas or cliches
will not help, and the announcement of rolling precedents will
only embarrass in the future.
Properly and responsibly applied, therefore, the summary judg-
ment procedure is an important and necessary part of the series of
devices designed for the swift uncovering of the merits and either
their effective immediate disposition or their advancement toward
prompt resolution by trial.
Krause Milling Co., 189 F. 2d 242 (3d Cir. 1951) ; United States v. New-
bury Mfg. Co., 123 F. 2d 453 (1st Cir. 1941) ; Klapprott v. United States, 335
U. S. 601 (1949) ; cf. Butler v. Ungerleider, 187 F. 2d 238 (2d Cir. 1951);
id. at 101 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. N.Y. 1951).
43. 321 U. S. 620, 624, 629 (1944) ; cf. note 21 supra.
